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The Challenge of Convincing Ethical Prosecutors
That Their Profession Has a Brady Problem
Adam M. Gershowitz*
Abstract
In recent decades, both the media and legal scholars have
documented the widespread problem of prosecutors failing to disclose
favorable evidence to the defense—so called Brady violations. Despite all
of this documentation, many ethical prosecutors reject the notion that the
criminal justice system has a Brady problem. These prosecutors—ethical
lawyers who themselves have not been accused of misconduct—believe
that the scope of the Brady problem is exaggerated. Why do ethical
prosecutors downplay the evidence that some of their colleagues have
committed serious errors?
This essay, in honor of Professor Bennett Gershman, points to what
psychologists have termed social identity theory and ingroup bias. Under
these concepts, people derive part of their identity and self-esteem from
membership in social groups. When someone from the group is accused
of misconduct, members of the ingroup are psychologically less able to
recognize or accept that a group member has committed the misconduct.
Social scientists have documented this phenomenon in children, sports
fans, Democrats, Republicans, racial groups, and warring religious
factions.
Ethical prosecutors are also likely susceptible to ingroup bias and
therefore probably find it more difficult than the average person to
acknowledge that individuals from their group have engaged in Brady
violations. This is particularly true given the nature of the Brady doctrine,
which is an amorphous test that requires judgment calls in close cases.
Ingroup bias does not mean that prosecutors as a group are unethical, but
simply that they are susceptible to the same types of psychological errors
as members of other groups. This paper applies social identity theory and
the concept of ingroup bias to prosecutors and offers some modest
suggestions for helping ethical prosecutors to recognize and respond to
the Brady problem.

*
Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, William &
Mary Law School. I am grateful to Elizabeth Brightwell and Fred Dingledy for exceptional research
assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than a dozen years ago, I moderated a symposium panel about Brady v.
Maryland1 that featured Bennett Gershman. The symposium audience consisted of
students, professors, and, most notably for purposes of this paper, prosecutors.
Professor Gershman pointed out that Brady had failed as a discovery doctrine
because, even though there are many Brady violations, it is exceedingly difficult to
discover them. And even when Brady violations are unearthed, courts often do not
reverse convictions. Professor Gershman thus concluded that “it is readily apparent
that Brady violations are among the most pervasive and recurring types of
prosecutorial violations” and that “[n]umerous studies have documented widespread
and egregious Brady violations.”2
Multiple prosecutors in the audience responded with hostility to Professor
Gershman’s presentation. One prosecutor angrily raised his voice and expressed
outrage that Professor Gershman had suggested that prosecutors as a group were
unethical. But Professor Gershman had done no such thing. He had simply pointed
out some basic facts: (1) there are a considerable number of Brady violations; (2)
those violations have been widespread in some offices; and (3) innocent defendants
have been convicted because of Brady violations. Professor Gershman never
suggested that all prosecutors were engaged in misconduct, and he certainly never
suggested that the particular prosecutors in the audience had engaged in misconduct.
The prosecutor in the audience nevertheless acted as though he had been personally
attacked and seemed unable to acknowledge the existence of Brady problems in the
criminal justice system.
What should we make of this story? Perhaps it was an isolated incident.
Perhaps most prosecutors recognize that some of their colleagues have committed
misconduct. Certainly, Professor Gershman and other scholars have chronicled
more than enough prosecutorial misconduct to make the entire criminal justice
system aware that Brady problems exist.3 Yet, I do not think the prosecutor’s hostile
response to Professor Gershman’s presentation was an isolated instance.4 Rather,

1

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2

Here I quote from the subsequent law review article Professor Gershman contributed to the
symposium. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 688
(2006).
3
Professor Gershman’s treatises are required reading for scholars in both the ethics and
criminal procedure fields and they are geared not only to academics but to lawyers as well. See
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed. 1999); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
CRIMINAL TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT (3d ed. 2015).
4

As Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky has explained:

Prosecutors believe that the problem of prosecutorial misconduct is overstated. . . .
[P]rosecutors believe that (1) meritless claims of prosecutorial misconduct have become a
standard defense tactic; (2) they face misperceptions and negative images of their activities
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because prosecutors are part of a tight-knit group, there is reason to believe their
group identity makes it more difficult for them to appreciate wrongdoing by
members of their group.5 Psychologists call this phenomenon social identity theory
and ingroup bias.
Social identity theory posits that people define themselves and improve their
self-esteem based on their group memberships.6 To the extent that a person’s social
group is seen positively, the individual’s self-esteem also improves. Put differently,
the better a person’s social group is perceived, the better the person feels about
themselves. This, in turn, opens the door to ingroup bias. People tend to attribute
success of their group or group members to merit or hard work. By contrast, there
is a tendency to attribute failure or misconduct by the group or group members to
external factors or to downplay the existence of those failures or misconduct.7 When
a group member behaves poorly, others in the group may have a tendency to protect
the group (and thus their own self esteem) by finding another explanation for the
poor behavior or by discounting the existence of the misconduct altogether.
This essay aims to make a small addition to the burgeoning literature about the
psychology of prosecutorial behavior. In doing so, I do not intend to be more critical
of prosecutors than of the average citizen though. As I have written elsewhere, I
believe the vast majority of prosecutors are ethical, over-worked public servants8
and that a large amount of prosecutorial misconduct is in fact accidental.9 At the
same time, the belief that most prosecutors are hard-working, well-intentioned, and
ethical does not mean that there are not widespread Brady violations in the criminal
justice system. This essay aims to explain how simultaneously (1) there can be
widespread Brady problems throughout the United States, and (2) ethical
prosecutors can fail to recognize the scope of the Brady problem. The article points
to social identity theory and ingroup bias as part of the explanation.
in the media, such as charges that “prosecutors feel that [they] are above the law”; and (3)
it is incorrect to assume that they are not subject to professional discipline.
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously,
8 UDC L. REV. 275, 292–93 (2005); see also Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial
Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 60 (2016) (quoting a prominent prosecutor as saying
that prosecutorial misconduct is “more episodic than epidemic”). Recently, a federal prosecutor argued
that “prosecutorial misconduct occurs with admirable infrequency.” See Timothy C. Harker, Faithful
Execution: The Persistent Myth of Widespread Prosecutorial Misconduct, 85 TENN. L. REV. 847, 850
(2018).
5

Professor David Harris has made this point with respect to police. DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED
EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 11, 106 (2012).
6

See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.

7

See infra notes 43–68 and accompanying text.

8
See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 261 (2011).
9

See id. at 263.
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Part II of this essay recounts the well-known fact that there are a lot of Brady
violations throughout the United States. Part III then explores the language—a
language of fault—that we use to discuss those Brady violations. Part IV then delves
into the social science literature on social identity theory and ingroup bias. In
particular, Part IV explores studies and data about children, sports fans, Republicans,
Democrats, racial groups, and rival religious groups to demonstrate that when an
individual perceives criticism of someone in their group that they are less willing to
accept objective evidence. Part V then considers some ways in which we can
approach the discussion of Brady violations to make it more likely for prosecutors
to appreciate the scope of the Brady problem.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE BRADY PROBLEM
It is difficult to know how many Brady violations are committed by prosecutors
each year.10 Scholars typically cite to major studies by newspapers, nonprofits, and
academics. For instance, the Chicago Tribune reviewed 11,000 homicide
convictions between 1963 and 1999 and found that courts reversed 381 cases for
Brady violations.11 In 2003, the Center for Public Integrity reviewed more than
11,000 appellate decisions that involved claims of prosecutorial misconduct and
found that more than 2,000 cases involved reversible errors, the majority of which
were Brady violations.12 A Pittsburgh Gazette study of 1,500 cases found numerous
Brady violations.13 The Northern California Innocence Project documented dozens
of Brady violations in California courts between 1997 and 2009.14 In an earlier
paper, I found that more than two-dozen death penalty cases were reversed for Brady
violations between 1997 and 2007.15 Indeed, in his landmark study on capital

10

See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943, 1945 (2010) (“Brady is a hidden problem
for which it is impossible to gather accurate data.”).
11

See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999.

12

See Steve Weinburg, Breaking The Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutor is Cited for
Misconduct,
The
Center
For
Public
Integrity
(June
26,
2003),
https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/breaking-the-rules/ (last updated May 19, 2014).
13

See Bill Moushey, Win at All Costs: Hiding the Facts, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 24,

1998.
14
See KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE PROJECT
37 (2010), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ncippubs.
15

See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1076 (2009).
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reversals, Professor James Liebman found that Brady violations were the most
common reversible error in death penalty cases.16
While these studies show a widespread Brady problem, they offer an
incomplete picture and actually understate the problem.17 Many Brady violations
never come to light because it is by definition very difficult to unearth evidence that
prosecutors never provided to defendants. Moreover, most studies of Brady
violations principally focus on deliberate prosecutorial misconduct. Newspapers
and reform organizations draw our attention to prosecutors who actively hide
evidence and recidivist Brady violators.18 These cases are sensational and
outrageous. But, of course, the problem goes further because a prosecutor can
commit a Brady violation accidentally.19 A prosecutor runs afoul of Brady by failing
to turn over favorable evidence that is material. Multiple scholars have observed
that it is quite difficult for prosecutors, who are looking at a case from the
prosecution’s perspective with the belief that a defendant is guilty, to easily see all
of the evidence that a defendant might use to show he is innocent.20
Moreover, favorable evidence includes not just exculpatory evidence but also
impeachment material. Ethical prosecutors may not recognize impeachment
evidence staring them in the face. For instance, imagine a domestic violence case
in which it is obvious that the victim was beaten by her husband. As too often
occurs, the victim initially denies that her husband hit her.21 After talking with
investigators though, she eventually acknowledges that her husband was the
16
See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 19731995 ii (2000).
17
See Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial
Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 513 (2011) (“The failure to discover prosecutorial misconduct is
especially likely in cases of Brady violations.”).
18

See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.

19
The prosecutor need not have a culpable mental state to commit a Brady violation. See
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 288 (1999) (“[U]nder Brady an inadvertent nondisclosure has the
same impact on the fairness of the proceedings as deliberate concealment.”); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (“Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral
culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecutor. If evidence highly probative of innocence is in his
file, he should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked it.”).
20

See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533 (2010);
Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2132 (2010); Bruce A. Green,
Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn
from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2163–65 (2010); Alafair S. Burke,
Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 513 (2009); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal
Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 569.
21

See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
officer testified that it was “‘very common’ for victims of domestic abuse initially to deny that they
had been assaulted” and reviewing cases noting that victims “may fear that by complaining to police,
he or she might expose himself or herself to likely future harm at the hands of a hostile aggressor who
may remain unrestrained by the law.”).
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perpetrator. Because prosecutors may be completely convinced of the husband’s
guilt, they might not recognize that the wife’s initial denial that the husband hit her
is Brady material that must be disclosed to the defense. This scenario and others
like it is common because misdemeanors and low-level felonies are often handled
by junior prosecutors with only a few months or years of experience under their
belts.22
Additionally, we must recognize that law schools typically do an inadequate
job of training future lawyers about Brady situations they will likely encounter,23
and instead focus on dry legal language about how to define materiality.24 The ethics
rules also do an inadequate job of helping prosecutors to avoid misconduct.25 Nor
do all district attorneys’ offices do a capable job of training their prosecutors about
Brady obligations.26 And to top it off, consider that the average prosecutor is
extremely overburdened and is rushing through more cases than she can carefully
handle.27 The result is not just flagrant Brady violations by unethical prosecutors,
but also accidental violations by well-meaning prosecutors who are inadequately
trained and overburdened.
In short, as Professor Gershman explained in 2010, “a large and growing body
of empirical and anecdotal evidence exists suggesting that Brady violations are the
most common type of prosecutorial misconduct” in all criminal cases.28
III. HOW DO WE TALK ABOUT PROSECUTORS AND BRADY VIOLATIONS?
After recognizing that we have a lot of Brady violations, the next question to
ask is how do we talk about those violations. The traditional approach taken by
22

See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 8, at 271.

23

The Supreme Court’s suggestion in Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64–66 (2011), that
attorneys receive adequate training for the Brady doctrine in law school and through their own efforts
at continuing education is simply not correct.
24
For a thoughtful discussion of how clinicians can teach beyond the black letter law and bring
Brady cases to life, see Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 415–18 (2011).
25

See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399.
26

See Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and Supreme Court Justices About Brady
v. Maryland, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 517, 521 (2012) (describing the lack of training in the New Orleans
District Attorney’s Office that gave rise to Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011)).
27
28

See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 8.

Bennett L. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception to Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations,
HARV.
C-R-C.L.
L.
REV.,
AMICUS
(2010),
http://harvardcrcl.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/08/Gershman_Publish.pdf; see also Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 4, at 52
(“[T]here has been increased acceptance of the argument that prosecutorial misconduct is widespread
and systemic . . . .”).
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academics and reformers is what Professor Alafair Burke has termed a language of
fault. As Professor Burke has explained:
[T]he literature on prosecutorial decision-making is dominated by a
language of fault. When examining the ways that prosecutorial decisions
contribute to wrongful convictions, scholars and commentators have
generally attributed bad prosecutorial decisions to widespread
prosecutorial “misconduct” that is symptomatic of a deeply flawed
prosecutorial culture. . . .
The language of fault similarly permeates the discourse surrounding
the discussion of prosecutorial disclosure of evidence to the defense.
Advocates of expanded discovery rights for defendants portray
prosecutors as valuing conviction rates over justice. Motivated by the
accolades, bragging rights, and future career advancements that come with
high win-loss records, the prosecutors described in much of the traditional
Brady literature intentionally, knowingly, or at least recklessly withhold
potentially exculpatory evidence, playing “games” with a doctrine that
allows them to maximize their conviction rates [my] [sic] gambling with
justice. From this perspective, a critical flaw in Brady is the doctrine’s
entrustment of the disclosure process to wily prosecutors who rationally
conclude that they can withhold exculpatory evidence with impunity
because the odds favor them at every stage of the process.29
Many scholars have embraced the language of fault, some of them quite
unabashedly. For instance, Professor Abbe Smith describes a “prosecutor
personality”30 and tells stories of “smugness, self-importance, and lack of
imagination” in describing “how many prosecutors think.”31 Professor Smith
suggests full-throated criticism of prosecutors is appropriate because it is not “wrong
to find fault where there has been some.”32 Other critics, while less overt,
nevertheless seem to paint prosecutors with a broad brush of fault. For instance,
then-Judge Alex Kozinski (before resigning in scandal) suggested that prosecutors

29

Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 2127–28.

30

Abbe Smith, Are Prosecutors Born or Made?, 25 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 943, 955 (2012).

31

Id. at 949.

32
Id. at 958 n.88. Professor Smith asserts that “prosecutors bear some responsibility for mass
incarceration, an obscene condition of American life that we will one day look back on in shame.” Id.
at 952. For present purposes, I am not interested in the question of whether prosecutors are culpable
for contributing to mass imprisonment. Instead, I am interested in the more practical question of
whether the language we use to talk about prosecutors is impeding our ability to effectuate needed
reforms.
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as a group do not play fair.33 In a recent and high-profile book, Professor John Pfaff
laid the blame for mass incarceration at the feet of prosecutors.34
Increasingly, however, academics are looking at the problem somewhat
differently. Professor Burke advocates for less fault-based rhetoric in discussing
Brady violations, wrongful convictions, and other criminal justice system flaws.35
Professor Susan Bandes has likewise embraced the idea that we should direct our
attention to the ethical prosecutors who act in good-faith “because the focus on fault
and blame is in many respects counterproductive.”36 And in critiquing Professor
Pfaff’s book, my colleague Jeffrey Bellin has colorfully rejected the idea that
“[p]rosecutors are the Darth Vader of academic writing: mysterious, powerful and,
for the most part, bad.”37
Although cases of flagrant prosecutorial misconduct do call for aggressive
condemnation, I want to add my voice to the view that the language of fault can
sometimes be counterproductive. In particular, when trying to convince ethical
prosecutors to recognize the existence of Brady violations around the country, a
fault-based rhetoric may be counterproductive. As described in Part IV below,
prosecutors are likely susceptible to social identity theory and ingroup bias. These
psychological phenomena make it difficult for prosecutors to accept that their
colleagues have committed misconduct. And this problem is likely only exacerbated
by aggressive criticism of prosecutors as a group.
IV. PROSECUTORS ARE LIKELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO INGROUP BIAS
Legal scholars have increasingly turned to social science literature in an effort
to understand some of the problems with prosecutorial decision-making. For
instance, in their influential article, Professors Keith Findley and Michael Scott
showed how well-meaning prosecutors can develop tunnel vision about defendants’
guilt because of confirmation bias, hindsight bias, and outcome bias.38 Professor
Alafair Burke has written widely about how prosecutors’ exercise of discretion is
affected by cognitive bias, selective information processing, belief perseverance,
33

See Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, viii

(2015).
34

See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017).
35

See Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, supra note 20.

36
Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW.
L.J. 475, 485 (2006); see also Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1328 (1999).
37

Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration,
116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018).
38

See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291.
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and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance.39 These scholars demonstrate how
cognition problems and tunnel vision adversely affect investigation, charging
decisions and Brady disclosures, and cause incorrectly sticky presumptions of guilt
both before and after trial.40 In short, social science helps to explain how ethical
prosecutors face psychological obstacles in handling specific criminal cases.
Social science can also help explain why ethical prosecutors may fail to
recognize that their profession has a Brady problem. Psychologists have long
recognized the related concepts of social identity theory and ingroup bias. Under
social identity theory, people derive part of their identity and self-esteem from
membership in social groups.41 The way we think of ourselves is determined by
group characteristics that are immutable (for instance, nationality, gender, and race)
as well as from chosen group memberships such as political parties, sports teams, or
professional affiliations.42 The concept of ingroup bias provides that when someone
from a group is accused of misconduct, other members of that group are
psychologically less able to recognize that their colleague may have engaged in
misconduct. As one group of psychologists has explained:
People prefer their ingroup to an outgroup, they interpret more leniently
an ambiguous behavior performed by an ingroup member than by an
outgroup member, they excuse more readily antinormative behaviors
committed by an ingrouper than by an outgrouper, they perceive bias in
neutral reports of their conflict with an outgroup, they attribute more
positive attributes to the ingroup than to the outgroup, and so on.43
A key part of social identity theory and ingroup bias is the salience with which
the individual identifies with the group. If an individual makes identity in a
particular group especially important to them, they are even more prone to ingroup

39

See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive
Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007); Alafair S. Burke, Commentary, Brady’s
Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 575 (2007).
40

See Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making, supra note 39, at 1603–13; Findley
& Scott, supra note 38, at 307–22. Of course, there are other factors beyond psychology that cause
prosecutors to resist viable claims of innocence. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004) (considering, inter
alia, institutional culture and politics).
41

See, e.g., Sabine Otten & Ernestine H. Gordijn, Was It One of Us? How People Cope with
Misconduct by Fellow Ingroup Members, 8 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 165, 166 (2014).
42

See id.

43
Jacques-Philippe Leyens et al., The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of
Secondary Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 186, 187
(2000) (citations omitted).
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bias.44 Social science research also indicates that “ingroup favouring responses are
expressed more strongly when the group’s identity is threatened.”45
There are a variety of related psychological explanations for discounting
misconduct by ingroup members. Some researchers have posited that “people not
only have a conception of who they are as individuals but also derive part of their
self-image from the social groups to which they belong.”46 Under that theory,
association with a group creates a sense of identity and increases self-esteem.47 As
a result, psychologists have demonstrated that people tend to attribute more uniquely
human characteristics to their ingroup than to outgroups.48 Other researchers have
observed:
People are more likely to refuse incorporation of negative elements into
their group’s collective identity in order to maintain a positive group (self)
image . . . . Consequently, group members might engage in denial of their
group’s negative behavior, legitimization of their ingroup’s actions or
simply claim that the ‘current’ ingroup is not the one that committed those
horrible things.49
A diverse set of examples help to illustrate social identity theory and ingroup
bias in practice. Sports is the most obvious starting point. In sporting events, fans
are less likely to see fouls and misconduct by their own team. At the same time,
they are likely to interpret behavior by the other team (the outgroup) as misconduct.
44

See Bertjan Doosje et al., Guilty by Association: When One’s Group Has a Negative History,
75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 872 & 885 (1998) (describing the hostile reaction of Germans
to Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s book, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, and explaining that “for those people
whose German identity is relatively important, defensive behavior is a more likely means of dealing
with their nation’s unfavorable past”); Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future
of an Identity Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 284 (2000) (discussing identity salience).
45

Paul Hutchison & Dominic Abrams, Ingroup Identification Moderates Stereotype Change in
Reaction to Ingroup Deviance, 33 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 497, 498 (2003); see also Nyla R.
Branscombe & Daniel L. Wann, Collective Self-Esteem Consequences of Outgroup Derogation When
a Valued Social Identity Is on Trial, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 641 (1994).
46

Bertjan Doosje et al., supra note 44, at 873.

47

See id.

48

See Jacques-Philippe Leyens et al., Psychological Essentialism and the Differential
Attribution of Uniquely Human Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 395
(2001).
49
Sabina Čehajić et al., What Do I Care? Perceived Ingroup Responsibility and
Dehumanization as Predictors of Empathy Felt for the Victim Group, 12 GROUP PROCESS &
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 715, 717 (2009) (citations omitted); see also Michael J.A. Wohl et al.,
Collective Guilt: Emotional Reactions When One’s Group Has Done Wrong or Been Wronged, 17
EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (2006) (“According to social identity theory, people are motivated to
perceive their ingroup positively.”) (citations omitted).
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In a famous study of a rough, injury-filled 1951 football game between Princeton
and Dartmouth, fans of each team thought the other side had engaged in more
flagrant misconduct.50
Modern sports fans are also quick to discount the misconduct of their team and
its players. For instance, Baltimore Ravens fans were able to minimize the
significance of domestic violence charges against star player, Ray Rice, after a video
surfaced of him punching his wife in an elevator.51 During the DeflateGate
controversy, New England Patriots fans were far less likely to believe their star
quarterback, Tom Brady, had broken the rules by using intentionally deflated
footballs during the AFC championship. In a survey conducted by the New York
Times, only 16% of Patriots fans believed Brady had broken the rules, compared
with 67% of fans of other teams.52 Numerous other studies show ingroup favoritism
and bias in the sports context.53
Children exhibit ingroup bias as well. Psychologists’ studies of children have
found that they are more forgiving and more forgetful of bad behavior by children
in their group.54 For instance, in a study of Euro-Canadian and Native-Canadian
elementary school children, researchers showed pictures of groups of children and
told them about positive and negative behaviors.55 The Euro-Canadian children
recalled more positive and fewer negative behaviors about children from their
ingroup.56 Those same children recalled more negative and fewer positive behaviors
about children in the other group.57 Researchers found the same results with the
Native-Canadian children. In short, children saw less negative behavior in the
ingroup and more negative behavior in their outgroup.
50

See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954).
51

For a video of fan reactions, see The Ladies of Ravens Nation on Ray Rice, WASH. POST
(Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/sports/the-ladies-of-ravens-nation-on-rayrice/2014/09/12/4d39ab5a-3a67-11e4-a023-1d61f7f31a05_video.html?utm_term=.1f237cd9676f.
52
See Brendan Nyhan, Tom Brady and Political Beliefs: It Depends What Team You’re On,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2015.
53
See, e.g., Daniel L. Wann et al., The Impact of Team Identification on Biased Predictions of
Player Performance, 56 PSYCHOL. RECORD 55 (2006); Daniel L. Wann & Frederick G. Grieve, Biased
Evaluations of In-Group and Out-Group Spectator Behavior at Sporting Events: The Importance of
Team Identification and Threats to Social Identity, 145 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 531 (2005).
54
See Antonia Misch et al., The Whistleblower’s Dilemma in Young Children: When Loyalty
Trumps Other Moral Concerns, 9 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 250 (2018).
55
See Brandon Corenblum, What Children Remember About Ingroup and Outgroup Peers:
Effects of Stereotypes on Children’s Processing of Information About Group Members, 86 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 32 (2003).
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See id. at 42.
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Id.
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There is also evidence of ingroup bias with respect to race. In the infamous
O.J. Simpson case, the reaction to Simpson’s acquittal diverged on racial lines. A
substantial majority of Black observers cheered the decision, while a majority of
White observers believed Simpson escaped justice.58 Social identity theory helps to
explain that divergence. Black Americans, as a group, tend to distrust the criminal
justice system.59 They could see Simpson as a member of their ingroup who was
unfairly targeted by an outgroup of White law enforcement agents seeking to set him
up.60 Researchers have found similar dynamics in laboratory studies based on race,
gender, and nationality.61
Scholars have also identified ingroup bias in perceptions of violence between
religious groups. In one study, researchers showed both Catholics and Protestants
from Northern Ireland video footage of violence instigated by each group.62 Both
the Protestant and Catholic respondents were more willing to downplay violence
initiated by their own group. In both cohorts, group members were “two-and-a-half
to four times more likely to attribute violence to external rather than internal
causation.”63
And then, of course, there is politics. It should not be shocking that people who
identify with a political party are less likely to find blame or misconduct by members
of their own party. To take a recent and high-profile example, consider reaction to
Robert Mueller’s investigation into whether the Trump campaign colluded with
Russia during the 2016 election. A poll taken at the end of 2017 found that 52% of
respondents believed there had been election collusion, in contrast to 13% for
Republican voters.64
The same dynamic was at play when allegations arose that President Clinton
had an extramarital affair with Monica Lewinsky. The scandal first broke in January
1998 and President Clinton continued to deny the relationship into the summer of

58
See Victoria Kuhl, Disparities in Judgments of the O.J. Simpson Case: A Social Identity
Perspective, 53 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 531 (1997).
59

See, e.g., ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014).
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See Kuhl, supra note 58, at 541–42.

61
See Miles Hewstone, The ‘Ultimate Attribution Error’? A Review of the Literature on
Intergroup Causal Attribution, 20 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1990) (reviewing numerous studies,
though cautioning against over-reading the evidence).
62

See J.A. Hunter et al., Intergroup Violence and Intergroup Attributions, 30 BRIT. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 261 (1991).
63

See id. at 264.

64
See Brennan Weiss, Poll: Majority of Trump Voters Would Support Him Even if He Colluded
with Russia, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-voterssupport-him-even-he-colluded-with-russia-2017-12.
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1998.65 As of early August 1998, a majority of the public and nearly 70% of
Republicans believed that Clinton had not only had an affair but had also attempted
to have Lewinsky cover it up.66 By contrast, a far smaller percentage of Democrats
—less than 30%—believed the allegations.67 According to polling data from just
before impeachment proceedings began:
The public divides sharply along partisan lines over who they believe
more—Clinton or Lewinsky. Two-thirds of Republicans (66%) said they
would believe Lewinsky if she and Clinton offer different accounts of their
relationship, while 64% of Democrats said they would believe Clinton.
Among those who believe Clinton more than Lewinsky, most (57%)
would not be swayed even if Lewinsky provided new evidence, such as
tape recorded messages from her answering machine or personal gifts
from Clinton.68
Ignoring negative evidence based on political party goes well beyond the
Trump and Clinton scandals. Politically-involved individuals even tune out news
coverage that does not comport with the views of their political or ideological
group.69
From sports to children to politics to O.J. Simpson to war in Northern Ireland,
social scientists have shown ingroup bias in action. Perfectly normal, ethical people
are less willing to recognize improper behavior when it involves someone in their
group. Should this same logic apply to prosecutors? Although there is a surprisingly
small literature about ingroup behavior and lawyers,70 there is reason to believe
prosecutors would likewise be susceptible to ingroup bias.71

65
Peter Baker & John F. Harris, Clinton Admits to Lewinsky Relationship, Challenges Starr to
End Personal ‘Prying,’ WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1998, at A01.
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See Americans Unmoved By Prospect of Clinton, Lewinsky Testimony, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Aug. 4, 1998), http://www.people-press.org/1998/08/04/americans-unmoved-by-prospect-ofclinton-lewinsky-testimony/.
67

See id.

68

Id.

69

See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the
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For a discussion of the limited research on lawyers, see Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 12–16 (2009) (discussing Hugh Gunz &
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Serving in the trenches together gives prosecutors a distinct identity. They are
on the team that is “doing justice” and “locking up the bad guys.”72 As the late
Professor Andrew Taslitz explained, prosecutors “want to paint a flattering portrait
of the organization with which they identify.”73 And for many prosecutors who work
long hours side-by-side with their colleagues,74 it is likely a salient identification.75
To the extent prosecutors see themselves as “doing justice” by “taking the bad
guys off the streets,” they are the ingroup to be contrasted with various outgroups—
think of public defenders and the defendants themselves—whom the prosecutorial
group see as adverse players. Finally, prosecutors can see their identity (doing
justice and serving the good guys) as threatened when the news media and academics
point out instances of prosecutorial misconduct. As noted in Part II above, there has
been considerable reporting and scholarship identifying both individual and
systemic cases of prosecutorial misconduct in recent decades.76
Now circle back to what the social science literature tells us: a cohesive ingroup
that perceives itself as under attack from various outgroups provides a recipe for
ingroup bias.77 It should therefore seem quite plausible that prosecutors might have
trouble recognizing or acknowledging Brady violations. This does not mean these
prosecutors, as a group, are unethical. It does not mean that prosecutors are
indifferent to misconduct or that they condone Brady violations. It means that
ethical prosecutors, as a group, are more susceptible to psychological error because
ingroup bias alters their perceptions.78 Prosecutors are, therefore, more prone to
under-diagnose the Brady problems around them.
affect plea bargaining and that “lawyers may not be paradigms of rational actors in the plea bargaining
context.”).
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In some circumstances however, researchers have found a “black sheep effect.” To maintain
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V. CONVINCING ETHICAL PROSECUTORS THERE IS A BRADY PROBLEM
How then do we convince ethical prosecutors that their colleagues have
violated Brady v. Maryland? There is no magic solution, but there are a few
possibilities that may help: (1) Brady training that is specifically designed to
overcome cognitive bias; (2) a greater academic focus on inadvertent Brady
violations that steps back from the “us versus them” approach; and (3) continued
efforts to humanize the victims of Brady violations.
A. Training
Numerous scholars have advocated increased Brady training.79 Professor
Gershman’s approach is particularly instructive. In a 2012 article, Professor
Gershman laid out a Brady Training Program with a course syllabus.80 His
framework includes all of the key legal issues that criminal procedure professors
would cover in a traditional law school class, while also encouraging lawyers to look
beyond the Supreme Court and consider local rules, professional norms, and
governing ethics rules.81 Even more importantly, Professor Gershman’s framework
includes ten hypothetical questions that a facilitator can use to help prosecutors
analyze real-world situations, rather than just a list of legal rules.82
In addition to teaching legal rules and reviewing real-world problems, Brady
training should also alert prosecutors to cognitive biases that might affect them. As
Professor Alafair Burke has explained, “[a]lthough research on debiasing suggests
that awareness of cognitive biases is no panacea for perfect rationality, some
evidence suggests that educating people about the cognitive processes that cause
bias can improve the quality of decision making.”83 In particular, Professor Burke
points out that “empirical evidence demonstrates that the biasing effects of people's

18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 287 (1988)). Nevertheless, research seems to indicate that “people tend to
give ingroup members the ‘benefit of the doubt’ when intent is ambiguous but decidedly not when
hostile intent is clear.” Id. at 174. In other words, “ingroup bias can be viewed as sort of a default
reaction, operating automatically to protect ingroup positivity.” Id.
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pre-existing beliefs are mitigated when people are forced to articulate the opposing
perspective.”84
B. Focusing on Accidental Brady Violations
While prosecutors are engaged in training, academics and reformers should dial
down the temperature a little and focus some of their attention on accidental rather
than flagrant Brady violations. A Westlaw search for accidental or inadvertent
prosecutorial error turns up a fraction of results compared to a search for flagrant or
intentional prosecutorial misconduct.85 Put simply, the news media, reform
organizations, and academics devote a lot more ink to outrageous prosecutorial
behavior than to negligent conduct. This is obviously to be expected from the media
because they are in the business of selling copies and logging site hits. However,
academics and reformers should have a broader agenda.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that academics and reformers should ignore
overt misconduct. Prosecutors who commit intentional misconduct should be
identified and fired, and their offices should be put in the limelight in order to
pressure them to improve their training and hiring practices.86 But that should not
be the only focus, particularly in a world where social identity theory and ingroup
bias cause an “us versus them” dynamic. In order to reach ethical prosecutors and
convince them their colleagues are not performing adequately, the information
campaign cannot be entirely negative. A relentless focus on only flagrant
prosecutorial misconduct will cause an ingroup of prosecutors—even ethical
prosecutors—to downplay or ignore evidence in front of them. Rather, academics
and reformers should also highlight accidental Brady violations in an effort to make
a less hostile appeal to ethical prosecutors.
C. Humanizing Victims
While advocates may want to redirect their attention to accidental Brady
violations, they should stay the course with respect to the wrongful conviction
movement. Over the last few decades, academics and reformers have drawn
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enormous attention to those who have been wrongfully convicted.87 The innocence
movement is credited not only with freeing the wrongly convicted, but also with
contributing to the decline in the death penalty,88 enhancing DNA testing, improving
police investigation procedures, and increasing funding for indigent defense.89 This
focus on the suffering of victims—as opposed to the misconduct of prosecutors—
could prove beneficial in fighting ingroup bias and convincing ethical prosecutors
to recognize their profession has a Brady problem.
In studying mass atrocities, psychologists have found that dehumanization of
the victims allows the ingroup to psychologically reject full responsibility and
engage in moral disengagement.90 By contrast, perceiving another person as human
activates empathetic reactions.91 To the extent, academics and reformers can tell the
story of those who have suffered Brady violations and humanize them, it may serve
to reduce prosecutorial indifference to the Brady problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are tens of thousands of ethical prosecutors across the United States.92
At the same time, there are widespread Brady violations across the country. In some
cases, prosecutors have engaged in flagrant misconduct, but more often Brady
violations are probably accidental. This should not be surprising given that many
prosecutors receive minimal Brady training and carry heavy caseloads. Yet,
prosecutors—including ethical prosecutors—seem to resist the idea that their
profession has a Brady problem.
Social identity theory and ingroup bias may help to explain why prosecutors
downplay the Brady problem. Prosecutors likely identify strongly with their
colleagues and constitute a salient social group. In turn, psychological research
teaches us that when someone from the group is accused of misconduct, members
87
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of the ingroup are psychologically less able to recognize or accept that a group
member has committed the misconduct. Social scientists have documented this
phenomenon in children, sports fans, Democrats, Republicans, racial groups, and
warring religious factions. Prosecutors should be no different.
While academics and advocacy groups should be commended for identifying
Brady violations and advocating for change, the often-used language of fault may
contribute to ethical prosecutors downplaying the scope of the Brady problem.
Accordingly, academics and advocates should broaden their focus to hone in on not
just flagrant prosecutorial misconduct, but also accidental Brady violations. In
addition, we should continue to focus on wrongful convictions to humanize the
victims of Brady violations. Finally, law schools and district attorneys’ offices must
do better on training prosecutors to recognize Brady material and disclose it. These
modest steps will not be a panacea, but they should help ethical prosecutors to
recognize that their profession has a Brady problem. That recognition, in turn, can
continue to move us in the right direction of stamping out both flagrant and
accidental Brady violations.

